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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

3 April 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : PRC Meeting on Rhodesia, 5 April, 1:45-3:45 p.m.,
White House Situation Room

1. Action Requested: None; this memorandum is for your information and possible use at the PRC meeting.

2. Background: This PRC meeting, to be chaired by Secretary Vance, was generated by the President as a result of the DDCI's briefing of him on 28 March. (The DDCI's notes from that discussion are attached.) The need for a review of policy re Rhodesia arises, as you know, not only out of the perceived failure of our efforts to bring all the parties together within the framework of the "Anglo-American Plan," but also and even more urgently from the context of Congressional interests. This afternoon, however, we have received a new agenda which indicates a wide-ranging discussion of southern Africa.

3. The formal expressions of Congressional interest are:

- the Case-Javits-Moynihan Amendment (to the State foreign aid authorization bill), which calls on the Executive Branch to determine if the elections to be carried out by the Smith regime are fair and just, if all parties and population groups are given an opportunity to participate, and if the fairness of the elections is attested to by internationally recognized observers. Case-Javits further requires the President to cease U.S. observance of UN Security Council sanctions regarding Rhodesia if he determines that the conditions of the Amendment have been met. (The other consideration in the Amendment was a determination that Rhodesia

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had committed itself to negotiate in "good faith" with the Patriotic Front and other parties; this question is not at issue at the moment, although it could well come up again later despite Smith's "acceptance" of US-UK proposals for a meeting.)

- the McGovern-Hayakawa Resolution (passed by the Senate, but not yet -- if ever -- by the House), which calls for the selection by the president pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of two "co-chairpersons" who in turn are to select 25 to 50 private individuals to serve on a team to observe the Rhodesian elections and to report thereon to the Congress. This resolution is in the context of providing "assistance" to the President in reaching the determination required by Case-Javits.

4. The basic issue, of course, is whether the US should continue to insist on the inclusion of the Patriotic Front in a Rhodesian settlement or more or less tacitly accept the "internal settlement" and leave the internal leaders to conduct their own negotiations on their own terms with the external guerrilla leaders. The attached briefing, which is based on the DDCI's Presidential briefing notes, indicates what we think are some of the considerations and likely possibilities. We suspect that State's new, much broader, agenda will have the effect of fudging this central issue. State has argued in the past that no positive action on Rhodesia is desirable until Namibia has been put on track.

5. The potential intelligence contributions to this meeting would appear to be of two kinds:

- Factual materials of the kind called for under items of the PRC Agenda. Some of these are included in your briefing papers, and a number of them have been covered in the CIA memorandum disseminated to PRC principals at the DDCI's direction. Others, called for by the agenda just received, will be forthcoming ASAP.

This has been added at Tab C

- Suggestions re considerations, not on the formal agenda, that may have a bearing on US policy interests -- e.g., impact of our actions on Zambia; the possibility that the Soviets, too will be reviewing the bidding; trends in the Rhodesian economy. These subjects are covered in some degree in your briefing papers; we can provide more detail or address others where time permits.

6. I will be prepared to accompany you to this meeting if you so wish.

cc: DDCI

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DDCI MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

29 March 1979

DDCI MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation, 28 March 1979

Keen interest was shown in the briefing on Rhodesia. The observation was made that Muzorewa was not reputed to be a politician but he seemed to be doing quite well. He was a sensible man. It was noted that Muzorewa would prefer to deal with Mugabe while the whites would prefer Nkomo. I said that was correct.

I struck a particular reaction when I indicated that the South African attitude was hardening and that the possibility of Thatcher coming into power was giving heart to the Rhodesian whites.

When I noted later in the briefing that the Congress could preempt our options, the comment was made that the British might preempt them before the Congress did. He had not focused on the importance of the UK internal situation, but it clearly had a bearing. One possibility would be to cut a deal with the South Africans where they support us on Namibia and we would agree to recognize the internal settlement. Brzezinski was directed to organize an immediate PRC meeting on Rhodesia.

/s/

Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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* A 001 [] Collection Summary (abbreviated) on Rhodesia
has been added at the end of Tab D.

79-837

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 3, 1979

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
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The United States Representative to the United Nations
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Agenda, Discussion Paper, and Background Paper
for PRC Meeting on Rhodesia (U)

Attached is an agenda, a discussion paper and a background paper that
will be covered at Thursday's meeting on Rhodesia. (C)


Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

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Review on April 3, 1980

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Rhodesia Update - 5 April 1979

Elections: There will be 651 fixed voting booths in the urban areas situated at community halls, schools, etc. Over 2,000 "polling points," or mobile polling booths, will be established in the rural areas reportedly over a six-day voting period. The mobile booths will be installed at a "polling point" for two or more hours and then moved by truck to another location. [REDACTED]

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Observers: The Rhodesians are making preparations to accommodate about 300 journalists--in addition to American and British observers--during the election period. About 6 planes and/or helicopters will be available every day to fly the observers and journalists--accompanied by security personnel--to rural areas where the polling is being conducted. Observers and journalists who wish to leave the Salisbury area by ground transport will be provided security force convoys. [REDACTED]

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Press: The Rhodesian military has proposed lifting all restrictions on the press during the election period. Journalists would be free to enter the country, publish without censorship, and visit any area they pleased provided he or she was willing to risk travelling unescorted. Some conservative white leaders, however, are resisting this proposal.

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3 April 1979

PRC Talking Points, ordered to match PRC Agenda

I. South African posture

A. Harder line from two causes

- Internal scandal damaging to less extreme Afrikaner politicians
- Sense that present Western governments (US, UK) weak both in foreign (African) affairs and internally -- conservative trend setting in

B. South Africans thus likely pursue independent policy more vigorously than in past, on Namibia, Rhodesia, Angola

II. Namibia prospects still look dim to us

A. Nobody yet interested in honest elections per se

- South Africans want to keep SWAPO out, force them to contest at basic disadvantage with other parties
 - South Africans not ready to concede this impossible
- SWAPO wants "presence" inside Namibia that will make them look like winner already chosen, as they are by UN General Assembly, African Frontline. Questionable if they could win election and they sense it.

B. South Africans & SWAPO also want advantageous military positions if breakdown occurs or if things don't go their way (amounts to same thing). Each still trying to con us rather than work with us.

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- III. Rhodesia issue will not wait; inaction after election will be a decision in eyes of the parties.
- A. Neither side can impose yet on the other
- B. Each must continue to try to undermine and negotiate at same time -- wheel and deal to weaken other parties and rivals within own ranks
- This less true of whites, so far; they still the key players
 - To the extent whites willing make black government real, by giving blacks substance of things they want (land, jobs, educational opportunities), internal settlement will gain strength
 - But we doubt whites yet see need for vigorous or rapid change of this kind.
- C. So we think internal settlement likely to be shaky for some time to come -- will rest on deals rather than achievements..
- But South Africans can play major role in propping it up, or undercutting it, as they choose.

IV. Angola is obviously related to Namibia, somewhat less closely to Rhodesia

- A. Signs Cuban-Angolan relationship changing; hard yet to say just how.
- Some draw-down of Cuban troops (possibly going elsewhere in Africa) possible - 3,000 mentioned
 - Risky; UNITA still in field
 - Quality of relationship could become less exclusive, with or without draw-down, as result of Angolan search for broader contacts in both East and West blocs (bring more Portuguese back, lean more on East Europeans rather than Sovs or Cubans, try Chinese again).
 - Unlikely Angola would stop being platform for aid to ZAPU.



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- B. One thing fairly clear -- Angola/Zaire detente doing pretty well -- try to open Benguela RR this week, if UNITA permits
- C. South Africans could again be key factor here, if they choose to boost aid to UNITA as expression of overall harder line.

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DCI PRC Briefing

4 April 1979

Namibia: Status and Prospects

1. South African Prime Minister Botha and his foreign minister have concluded meetings with Namibian political leaders on results of the talks on Namibia in New York two weeks ago.
 - Botha asked the Namibians to decide within a week whether to accept Western proposals which partially meet South Africa's objections to the truce arrangements which the UN Secretary General announced in late February.
 - The tenor of Botha's meetings with the Namibians suggests that he is preparing for further hard bargaining with the Western sponsors of a Namibia settlement.
2. The South African Prime Minister not only addressed a closed session of the Namibian Constituent Assembly, but held extensive discussions with leaders of the political groups that boycotted the election of the assembly held last December.
 - Botha reportedly urged assembly members to reach a consensus with other leaders on how to respond to the latest Western proposals.
 - This signals a significant shift from Foreign Minister Roelof Botha's stance at the New York proximity talks, which implied that South Africa would soon proceed toward an internal settlement unless the

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UN truce plan were substantially revised to:

- Provide for UN monitoring of SWAPO forces in Angola and Zambia.

- Exclude any possibility that guerrillas inside Namibia after a cease-fire could maintain armed bases under UN monitoring.

3. Several Western envoys who met with the same spectrum of Namibian leaders shortly before Botha's arrival found a consensus that a truce should provide for effective monitoring of SWAPO guerrilla forces in neighboring countries, and should not allow SWAPO to maintain bases inside Namibia.

- The basic disagreement is between the members of the Constituent Assembly, who want to proceed toward independence without a UN-conducted election, and the other leaders, who hope that further negotiations will yield adequate truce arrangements.

- The principal centrist parties have proposed that all guerrillas who submit to UN monitoring inside Namibia be disarmed within a month of a cease-fire.

4. Hence Botha appears to have the backing of all the principal Namibian political groups except SWAPO for further negotiations, focused primarily on measures for disarming any SWAPO forces that emerge inside Namibia after a cease-fire.

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- As long as negotiations show progress, the Constituent Assembly probably can be held to merely planning for eventual independence.
- If negotiations prove fruitless, the other leaders are likely to feel compelled to participate in an "internal settlement."
- 5. SWAPO military commanders probably will continue current efforts to step up guerrilla infiltrations and small-scale terrorism until South Africa unreservedly accepts a UN truce plan and the frontline governments press SWAPO to do likewise.
- Although SWAPO Vice-President Muyongo pledged at the proximity talks to cease infiltrations as soon as a cease-fire agreement is concluded, he parried calls for pre-truce restraint.
- SWAPO President Nujoma and other long-exiled leaders who do not want to face an election probably will try to disrupt Prime Minister Botha's temporizing strategy as long as possible.
- Neto and Kaunda may withhold additional support for SWAPO as long as truce negotiations appear promising, but they are unlikely to actively restrain SWAPO's cross-border operations until a cease-fire agreement is concluded.
- Under these conditions, it is unlikely that SWAPO can much extend the current pattern of guerrilla activity (mostly in Ovamboland, near the Angolan border), but some small guerrilla bands may infiltrate white areas and carry out small but politically provocative attacks.

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6. The series of "lightning strikes" in early March against SWAPO forward bases (mostly in Angola) was primarily intended to preempt a surge of guerrilla infiltrations before an anticipated truce took affect.
- The South African military command reportedly concluded--probably from reliable intelligence--that the strikes were highly effective.
 - No significant South African strikes into Angola or Zambia are known to have occurred since shortly before the New York proximity talks and the simultaneous start of UN Security Council sessions on the Angolan protest of recent South African strikes.
 - Strikes apparently have been suspended because the immediate military objective was achieved and because Prime Minister Botha decided to avoid further provocations while the South Africans were seeking more favorable truce terms.
 - Botha may intend to restrain the military hawks who want to strike deeper into Angola as long as he believes that restraint will influence the Western Five--especially the US--toward meeting South Africa's demands on truce terms.
 - At the same time, Botha probably will take whatever military measures he considers necessary to prevent any significant increase in guerrilla activity inside Namibia.
 - He probably believes--with good reason--that even a few assassinations of prominent Namibians or other impressive guerrilla "exploits" would undercut South African influence in Namibia and exacerbate his government's current domestic embarrassments.

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DCI PRC Briefing

4 April 1979

South Africa: Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications
of the Information Department Scandal

1. A government appointed committee investigating the Department of Information scandals has exonerated Prime Minister P.W. Botha and the members of his cabinet from complicity in the misappropriation of public funds.
 - The committee report will not placate the small but vociferous political opposition. If the Prime Minister continues to escape being tarred by the public revelations of political misdeeds, he may be able to reunite the ruling party under his leadership.
 - The scandal has renewed the power struggle that has long existed between the reform-minded left and ultra-conservative right ends of the National Party.
 - The reformists, led by Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha, have recently had their small parliamentary strength eroded by concerted conservative efforts and, because most of their parliamentary seats are vulnerable to opposition party attacks, their ranks could be decimated in an early election.

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- The conservatives have increased their strength and influence in the party. Dr. Andries Treurnicht, their leader, is now the second-ranking political figure in the country, and he presents a serious potential political challenge to Prime Minister Botha.
 - There have been indications that Prime Minister Botha might be pressured into calling an election soon, but he may be able to rally the party behind him without going to the polls in the immediate future.
 - To achieve party unity he must win the support of the conservatives and will therefore have to postpone some of the domestic reform programs he had hoped to initiate this year.
 - Although he appears to be getting no immediate political pressure from the party right wing on foreign affairs issues, the Prime Minister must tread carefully in his dealing on Rhodesia and Namibia. His party rivals could make quick political capital from any mistep which they construed as contrary to South Africa's best interests.
2. Should the Prime Minister be forced into an election within the next few months he would have to resort to hard-line tactics.
- He undoubtedly would build up the issue of the foreign threat against South Africa and exploit the seige mentality that won the Nationalists such an overwhelming political victory sixteen months ago.

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--He might take an even tougher and more unyielding stand on Namibian independence in order to rally English speakers to the Afrikaner cause and deter the right wing from criticizing his somewhat liberal domestic policies. This is a linkage he has not previously used in the Namibia negotiations.

--He would continue South African support to the interim government in Rhodesia in the hope of keeping it intact as long as possible.

3. If the conservative Afrikaners were to win control of the National Party in an early election:

--Their domestic posture would be regressive and repressive.

--Their stance on foreign policy matters would be far more uncompromising than that of the present South African regime.

--They would probably provide more open support to internal political settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia.

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DCI Briefing Notes

RHODESIA

- I. Elections. Mid-April. Case-Javits determination.
- II. GOR making all out effort for big show. Will be portrayed as compliance with western terms for black rule and will lobby hard for recognition and lifting sanctions. Preparations extensive.
 - A. Police and military leaves cancelled and reservists called up. Military force of 75,000.
 - B. Assisted by about 10,000 ex-guerrillas and local recruits of black coleaders Muzorewa and Sithole.
 - C. ZAPU and ZANU committed to disruption. 10,000 guerrillas inside. Thousands more before election. Intimidate voters stage incidents. Rhodesians likely strike again at bases in Mozambique and Zambia.
 - D. Whites, vote 10 April; blacks vote during a 5 day period after 12 April. Security forces rotated from one military district to another to provide maximum security.
- III. Rhodesians hope for 60% turnout. Pressure. Say is valid if only 20% of blacks vote. Will directly elect 72 blacks and 20 whites; 8 whites indirectly. Separate districts and rolls for white and black members.
 - A. Most likely victor is Muzorewa. Should win more than 1/2 of 72 black seats. Sithole has lost ground. Less than 1/3 of votes.
 - B. Despite results, Whites will control military, police, judiciary and civil service. Smith's Rhodesian Front Party is unopposed. Uncertain what role Smith will play.
 - C. Most whites not enthused but saying Let's try it. In January emigration reduced to about 1,000/mo.

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- IV. Election will not end war, nor will government win widespread recognition. Question is will accession of black government, albeit one with limited powers, alter the power balance.
- A. By itself answer is no. But election can't be looked at as an isolated event. Must be viewed as part of complex equation.
- Deepening Mugabe-Nkomo rift.
 - Dissention in ZIPRA ranks. Nkomo political decline.
 - Hardening South African attitude. Throwing weight behind int. settlement
 - Growing western support for internal settlement. US Congress and Thatcher.
- V. These factors account for growing confidence by white Rhodesians. Risk is that it will also harden their attitude and reduce chances of a political deal among blacks that could lead toward an eventual solution.
- VI. Muzorewa will move to strengthen relations with whites, establish control in countryside, and induce defections from ZAPU and ZANU. Will probably also try to split Patriotic Front even further.
- A. A Shona-based alliance between Muzorewa's party and Mugabe's ZANU. About 75% of blacks are Shona. Has already approached Mugabe about joining government.
- B. Muzorewa and Nkomo could cut a deal. While different tribes, white resistance to Nkomo alliance less than Mugabe.
- C. Many obstacles to both these deals; biggest impulse comes from mutual fear by Mugabe and Nkomo that other will cut a deal first.
- D. Neither of above alignments would tip balance sufficiently to end fighting, but could change complexion of war from one of equilibrium with prospect of growing strength on guerrilla side to one of momentum for internal solution.

VII. Election will create hard choices for the External Players.

- A. Front line states will continue to support guerrillas, but intensification of fighting could force Kaunda and Machel to accept open-ended commitment to Soviet and Cuban presence. Don't want. They also face prospects of supporting rivals in civil war. Thus, must support a deal under appropriate circumstances.
- B. Soviets presently backing Nkomo. Risk alienating Nyerere and Machel who also want Mugabe supported. If Nkomo cuts a deal with Muzorewa they have to choose between ZAPU and white allies or to shift to ZANU. If support both groups they retain credentials with Front Line states, but risk becoming involved in civil war.

VIII. Even larger dilemma faces US and UK:

- A. Western recognition and the lifting of economic sanctions would:
 - 1. Strengthen the position of the new government. There would be greater white resolve to support the black-led government and more willingness among whites in the military to defend it. Government could attract significant number of defectors from guerrilla forces.
 - 2. Improve the chances of stemming Rhodesia's economic decline. Worldwide demand is increasing for many goods produced by the Rhodesians such as copper, chrome, and gold.
 - 3. Provoke a serious erosion in the "special relationship" that the US has fostered with black African leaders -- particularly Nyerere, Kaunda, and Obasanjo. They would conclude that the Anglo-American Plan for Rhodesia was dead and would come under increased pressure to seek a military solution in Rhodesia.
 - 4. If the US and the UK pushed for the inclusion of ZANU and ZAPU in the new government, this might appease some of the African leaders. A call for the adoption of a new constitution providing for a quicker transition to black majority rule and approved by all Rhodesians -- not just the whites -- also might dispell some of the anger. This option, however, still would risk a major escalation of Soviet and Cuban involvement on the side of whatever guerrilla group is excluded from the government.

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- B. If West opts against recognition and lifting sanctions and continues to press negotiated settlement involving all parties to the dispute:
 - 1. The internal government's ability to take hold would be weakened. Emigration probably would increase. White extremist attitudes gain currency and last ditch military stand becomes only alternative. Deals between blacks more unlikely.
 - 2. The Front line states and Nigeria would continue to support the Anglo-American efforts toward a political settlement. They would regard the election merely as one step in a process that eventually will involve the guerrillas in a negotiated settlement.
 - 3. But Soviet and Cuban involvement with the guerrilla forces and in the host states would still increase.

IX. In sum:

- A. Everybody confident now -- Whites, ZAPU, ZANU. Pre-election struggle will provide test of military strength. Elections could shift center of gravity slightly away from guerrillas if Whites maintain security.
- B. Once in power, Muzorewa is likely to make overtures to either Mugabe or Nkomo, but we doubt at this point that the white leaders will show sufficient flexibility to allow Muzorewa to cut a deal attractive enough to bring either guerrilla leader into the internal settlement. He may, however, be able to induce significant defections. A successful all parties conference or agreement to hold UN supervised elections are not in the cards.
- C. Short-term prospects are for a continuing stalemate, particularly if South Africa opts to commit its resources in support of the new government of national unity.
- D. Over the long run, time probably is on the side of the guerrilla forces. The continuing struggle will provide expanding opportunities for the Soviets and the Cubans and prove costly for the West. Even if whites collapse after prolonged struggle, we anticipate turmoil as blacks compete for power.

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RHODESIA

Problems of corruption, fraud, and statistical manipulation:

Given the importance of the election to the internal government and the unstable security situation in many rural areas, some electoral irregularities can be expected. We doubt, however, that there will be any large scale falsification of the results.

--The election will be supervised by a serious and competent group of civil servants who are said to be doing what they can to preserve the fairness of the vote.

--Nevertheless, government pressure to produce a large turnout and particularly voter intimidation by the black parties and their auxiliary forces which are already taking place, are in themselves irregularities. Others, such as the counterfeiting of the ballots and the busing of supporters to different voting districts, could also take place, but probably on a limited scale.

--Each voter's hand will be dipped in a colorless liquid that will remain detectable under a machine for one to two weeks. This will not prevent electoral officials from looking the other way if it benefits their party to do so, but monitoring procedures will probably be strict enough to avoid widespread abuse.

RHODESIA

International Recognition of New Rhodesian Government

To our knowledge, no state is planning--or even seriously considering--recognizing the new Rhodesian government to be elected later this month.

--Some states, such as South Africa, Malawi, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Zaire, might decide to establish diplomatic relations if and when the new government demonstrates a capability to govern and looks like it might survive.

--Many of these states, and others such as Botswana and Zambia, will continue to trade with the Rhodesians.

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Rhodesia: Economic Situation and Outlook

I. The economy, a source of strength to the government of Prime Minister Ian Smith during most of the period since independence, has deteriorated in the past three years. [REDACTED]

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A. The contraction in national output that began in 1975 shows no signs of halting. [REDACTED]

25X1

1. Reduction in output in the last three years has been around 15 percent. [REDACTED]

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2. Real GNP decline in 1978 probably equalled 1977's seven percent rate. [REDACTED]

25X1

3. GNP will undoubtedly continue to slide in 1979. [REDACTED]

25X1

B. The economic slump largely reflects:

1. increasing burden of defense -- defense spending has nearly tripled in the last three years,

2. erosion of the middle class market by white emigration,

3. waning business confidence due to persistent guerrilla activity and highly uncertain political prospects, and

4. weak international demand for Rhodesian products, in part related to economic sanctions. [REDACTED]

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II. How the blacks come to power and how they treat white economic interests will, of course, have a decisive influence on the country's future and will determine whether the economy suffers a precipitous decline or whether a turnaround can be achieved. []

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A. A worst-case scenario would involve the departure of most Rhodesian whites accompanied by large-scale civil war. []

25X1

1. This would create chaotic economic conditions similar to those of post-independent Angola and Mozambique. []

25X1

2. Whichever guerrilla faction emerged as the winner of the civil war probably would adopt disruptive economic socialization policies, particularly in farming areas once reserved for whites. []

25X1

B. From an economic point of view, the best path to black majority rule would be along the lines of the Kenya model in which enough whites remain to assure a stable economic environment. []

25X1

1. A smooth transition accompanied by quick improvement in the country's security situation and international standing would probably reverse the economy's decline; even then they will need large amounts of financial assistance.

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Rhodesia: Enforcement of Sanctions

I. . Weak international demand for Rhodesian raw materials, in part because of economic sanctions, has contributed to Rhodesia's economic decline since 1974. [REDACTED]

25X1

A. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the impact of economic sanctions was mitigated by strong world demand and by the willingness of South Africa and Portugal to facilitate the flow of Rhodesian goods. [REDACTED]

25X1

B. As world demand slumped in the aftermath of the 1973/74 oil price hikes, the sanctions probably caused Rhodesia to suffer disproportionately. [REDACTED]

25X1

1. Rhodesian mining output dropped 8 percent during 1974-78 as many firms in developed countries turned to alternative suppliers of chromium, nickel, copper, tin, and asbestos. [REDACTED]

25X1

2. Chromium exports also were hard hit by:
a. the loss of the lucrative US market, which accounted for 25 percent of chrome sales prior to the March 1977 repeal of the Byrd Amendment, and

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b. a new metallurgical process (argon-oxygen decarburization, or AOD) which reduced the cost competitiveness of high-grade Rhodesian ores in the production of stainless steel. [] 25X1

II. Sanctions enforcement is far from airtight: willing to pay profitable fees to South African, Swiss, and other middlemen, Rhodesia apparently still has little trouble in selling and shipping exports. [] 25X1

A. South African businesses, which have substantial investment in Rhodesia, undoubtedly provide the principal conduits for Rhodesian trade. [] 5X1

B. All overseas Rhodesian trade is transported over road or rail connections with South Africa. []

25X1

C.



25X1

III. The current strengthening trend in international markets should result in increased demand for some of Rhodesia's minerals. []

25X1

25X1 A. US stainless steel producers reportedly have exceeded their AOD capacity and are turning to older electric furnaces that require high-grade ferrochrome produced from ores that are available principally from Rhodesia and USSR.

25X1 B. Copper prices are up about 60 percent over last year's average price to about \$1 per pound.

C. Record gold prices (\$240-\$250 a troy ounce) have pushed earnings from gold exports to well over \$100 million a year.

25X1

IV. Despite the sanctions, Rhodesia continues to get adequate petroleum supplies.

- A. Rhodesia meets its requirements either by purchasing products from South African refineries or by importing from third countries through South African ports.
- B. The increases in international oil prices since the Iranian political crisis have spurred Salisbury to raise retail gasoline prices by almost 30 percent to over \$1.30 a US gallon; Rhodesia already has gasoline rationing.

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Zambia: Food Situation and Dependence
on Rhodesian Rail Outlet

- I. Zambia has been hard hit by the drought in
Southern Africa.

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- A. The government -- perhaps optimistically --
is predicting that this year's maize harvest
will equal only one-half of annual domestic
consumption.

25X1

- B. To cover the shortfall of this dietary staple,
Zambia expects to import 350,000-400,000
metric tons.

25X1

1. This will place added financial strains on
Zambia, which is already short of foreign
exchange.

25X1

2. Possible suppliers of maize include:

- a. South Africa Facing a poor
harvest itself, South Africa has
turned down a Zambian bid for white
maize, which is preferred for human
consumption, but has offered yellow
maize.

25X1

- b. Rhodesia. Although harvests will be
down this year, Salisbury probably
would not refuse a Zambian request.
For political reasons Zambia would
ask Rhodesian assistance only as a
last resort.

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c. Kenya. Harvests are good and Nairobi may be able to supply some of Zambia's needs.

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d. The EEC, Mexico, and the US. Some Western diplomats have expressed the opinion that Zambia will wait until the food situation reaches "disaster proportions" and appeal to Western governments for emergency relief.

25X1

II. Of landlocked Zambia's four export/import routes, the Rhodesian rail outlet to efficiently run South African ports is the most expeditious.

25X1

A. The Tazara (Tanzam) railroad to Tanzania is plagued by inefficiency, derailments, strikes, and backlogs.

25X1

B. The "Great East Road," a rail and road route to Mozambique, is limited by congested ports and slow turnaround times.

25X1

C. The Benguela railroad to Angola has been closed since 1975.

25X1

III. Closure of the Rhodesian route would cause a sharp drop in Zambian copper exports and would reduce its ability to import food.

25X1

A. The Rhodesian route is targetted to handle 1,000 tons of copper exports per day.

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- B. Now used principally to handle imports of fertilizer and coal, the route would be needed to handle grain imports from outside Africa.

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IV. Because of its importance, Zambia is concerned that:

- A. Rhodesia may close the route to bring economic pressure on Lusaka.
- B. Rhodesian guerrillas (mainly ZAPU) may interdict the line.

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DCI PRC Briefing

4 April 1979

Angola: Foreign and Domestic Policy Concerns

1. Although the Angolan Government in recent months has improved its relations with the West, Luanda remains basically dependent upon Cuban and Soviet military and technical support. This relationship probably will not be significantly altered in the near future.
--President Neto has expressed his desire for Western economic and technical assistance, but internal and external security threats--and his own ideological concerns--dictate that he remain close to his Communist benefactors.
2. The Angolans are disappointed that no tangible results accrued from the visits to Luanda of high ranking US officials late last year. They are determined, however, not to give in to US insistence that diplomatic recognition be accompanied by a reduction of the Cuban military presence in Angola.
--Angola's leaders believe that the South African threat--demonstrated by the recent air strikes--would not allow for a significant reduction in the approximately 20,000-man Cuban military presence.
--Luanda probably is disappointed with the failure of the Cuban defenses to detect or deter the South African and Rhodesian raids.
--Havana has indicated that it might like to reduce the military force.

3. Although Neto would like to see the Namibia problem resolved, the Angolans are increasingly suspicious of South Africa.
4. Angola's relations with Zaire continue to improve. Despite ideological differences and considerable distrust, Presidents Neto and Mobutu are continuing to cooperate on border security and other issues of mutual concern.

--Neto would like to resolve the problems on his northern and southern borders so that he may turn his attention to internal problems.

--The Angolans apparently are continuing their efforts to keep larger groups of anti-Mobutu rebels from mobilizing in northern Angola where they could prepare another strike into Zaire's Shaba Region.

--Small groups of anti-Mobutu dissidents remain in northern Angola, however, and the Angolan Government is unable to control them. Another invasion of Shaba by ex-Katangans or continued Angolan frustrations in dealing with UNITA could lead to charges of support for one another's dissidents, thereby threatening the rapprochement. The expected departure this summer of the Inter-African Force from Shaba could encourage Zairian dissidents in Angola to launch new incursions into Zaire.

--Another major issue is the reopening of the Benguela Railroad. Plans have been made to send a shipment of ore from Shaba through Angola via the Benguela this month, but the line probably will prove to be insecure and vulnerable to UNITA attacks along the 1,400 kilometer route.

- Angola and Zaire also have cooperated closely on the repatriation of tens of thousands of refugees.
- 5. Neto has strengthened his personal control of the government, but Angola is facing numerous economic and social problems that will not be quickly or easily resolved.
 - Food shortages, transport problems, and the lack of trained personnel are contributing to Angola's worsening internal conditions.
 - Oil from Cabinda is the country's principal earner of foreign exchange.
 - Neto is in firm control of the government, but the combination of growing economic and political problems, military pressures, and ethnic and ideological cleavages are an ever present threat to his rule.
- 6. Insurgents of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) continue to pose an obstacle to Neto's desire to solidify his control over the country.
 - UNITA, with a force of approximately 18,000 men, operates rather freely over large portions of southern Angola despite combined government and Cuban military actions against it.
 - UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi is concerned over the Angolan Government's diplomatic and political gains in recent months and is determined to maintain pressure on Luanda by demonstrating that his insurgency remains a force to be reckoned with. UNITA's attention is focused on the Benguela Railroad--much of which runs through territory in which the insurgents operate. Savimbi's forces probably will be able to keep the railroad from running normally for the foreseeable future.

7. Despite a decrease in external assistance to UNITA, the insurgents apparently are able to obtain sufficient materiel to maintain an active movement. Their capability to effectively oppose the government is expected to continue.

--It is unlikely that the Angolan Government will negotiate with the insurgents. It is equally unlikely that the government will be able to defeat UNITA militarily in the foreseeable future.

--As the Angolan Government continues to win acceptance from moderate African states and from other Western governments, UNITA's diplomatic and materiel support could continue to wither. A settlement of the Namibia situation would also further isolate UNITA from a sympathetic South African Government.

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23 March 1979

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES
DURING THE APRIL ELECTION

Army

Regulars	6,000	
Active Duty Reservists	<u>12,000</u>	
Total Army		18,000

Air Force

1,500

Police and Paramilitary

Regular Police	8,000	
Reserve Police	35,000	
Guard Force	6,000	
Paramilitary Guard Units	5,000	
Dad's Army (50-59 year olds mobilized for security duty during the election)	<u>1,000</u>	
Total Police and Paramilitary		55,000

Auxilaries

Loyal to Sithole	2,000	
Loyal to Muzorewa	<u>8,000</u>	
Total Auxilaries		<u>10,000</u>

TOTAL FORCES		84,500
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30 March 1979

RHODESIAN EQUIPMENT INVENTORY
(as of 30 March 1979)

Ground Forces

Tanks	none
Armored vehicles (Ratels, Elands, Ferret)	60
Artillery (25 pounders, 5.5 inch guns)	24
Anti-aircraft artillery	none
Surface-to-air missiles	none

Air Forces

Bombers (Canberra)	4-5
Fighters	
Hunter	10
Vampire	11

Counter-insurgency

O-2	14
SF-260	12
Trainers (SF-260)	12-22
Transports	
DC-3	12
Islander	6
Helicopters	
AB-205	8-11
Alouette II/III	42

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30 March 1979

GUERRILLA EQUIPMENT INVENTORIES

ZAPU

- SA-7 surface-to-air missile
- 60mm mortars
- 82mm mortars
- 122mm manportable, single-tube rockets
- B-10 82mm recoilless rifles
- RPG-2/7 anti-tank weapons
- 14.5mm anti-aircraft machine guns
- a variety of Soviet small arms
- may have some light field artillery pieces

ZANU

- may have a few SA-7 surface-to-air missiles
- 60mm mortars
- 82mm mortars
- 120mm mortars (a few)
- 122mm manportable, single-tube rockets
- B-10 82mm recoilless rifles
- PRG-2/7 anti-tank weapons
- 14.5mm anti-aircraft machine guns
- a variety of Communist-bloc small arms

25X1

23 March 1979

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLE'S UNION
AS OF MID-MARCH

In Rhodesia 2,000

Other Trained

Hq, Staff, Training	2,500
Support Camps	2,800
In Botswana	200
Holding Camps	<u>7,000</u>
Total	12,500

Under Training

In Zambia	7,500
Mulungushi -	5,500
From Angola-	2,000
In Ethiopia	500-1,000
In Angola	2,000
Elsewhere	<u>1,000</u>
Total	11,000

Available for Training

In Zambia	8,000
In Botswana	<u>9,000</u>
Total	<u>17,000</u>

TOTAL 42,500

25X1

23 March 1979

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION
AS OF MID-MARCH

In Rhodesia 8,000

Other Trained Personnel 7,000

Under Training

Tanzania 3,000

Libya 500

Ethiopia & elsewhere 2,500

Total 6,000

Available for Training 10,000

TOTAL 31,000

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2 April 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: South African Arms Potentially Available for Rhodesia

I. South Africa has the strongest military force in sub-Saharan Africa and a wide variety of modern weapons and military equipment.

A. We estimate the army equipment inventory includes the following:

<u>280 tanks</u>	<u>2,000 other armored combat vehicles</u>
160 Centurions	1,200 Eland armored cars
100 Shermans	230 Ferret scout cars
20 comets	280 Saracen APCs
	100 Ratels armored vehicles
	200 light personnel carriers
<u>200 artillery pieces</u>	<u>mortars</u>
48 Sexton 25 pounders	unk 81 mm mortars
132 25-pounder howitzers	423 3-inch mortars
25 3.5 inch guns	unk 60 mm mortars
<u>antitank weapons</u>	<u>100 air defense artillery</u>
unk 3.5 inch rocket launchers	16 3.7 inch ADA
unk Entac missiles	24 40 mm Bofors
unk SS-11 missiles	60 35 mm Oerlikons

B. We estimate the Air Force inventory includes the following:

<u>5 light bombers</u>	<u>32 all-weather fighters</u>
5 Canberras	16 Mirage III

This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Strategic Research. Queries and comments may be addressed to

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51 fighter-bombers

30 Mirage F1
16 Mirage III
5 Buccaneer

76 transports

43 C-47s
9 Transalls
7 C-130s
17 others

385 trainers

229 Impalas
126 T-6s
30 others

25 reconnaissance

7 Mirage III
18 Piaggio

53 transport helicopters

39 Pumas
14 Super Frelon

94 utility helicopters

90 Alouette IIIs
4 Alouette IIs

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CONFIDENTIALANGOLA

Angola did not participate in the proximity talks in New York two weeks ago and has refused thus far to agree to the establishment of an UNTAG office in Luanda. This attitude probably results from its assessment that the South African Government is not really serious about reaching a Namibia settlement, especially in light of recent South African raids against SWAPO bases in Angola.

The Angolan attitude may also reflect in part its dissatisfaction that previous cooperation on Namibia and Shaba has not led to normalization of relations with the U.S.

Angola's continued cooperation on the Namibia question is important to us. While declining to participate directly in the proximity talks or to accept an explicit UNTAG presence, it was clear in New York that the Angolans went along with the positive Front Line position. If the Namibia settlement should go forward, Angola's more active cooperation would be essential to its successful implementation. In this connection, an official U.S. presence in Luanda could make a critical difference in working out the problems which will inevitably arise.

It was apparent from our last direct talk with the Angolans in Luanda last November that we share a strong common interest in obtaining a Namibia settlement. The Angolan's main concern is to remove the South African threat from their borders. That threat is the major rationale the Angolans cite for the continued Cuban combat presence. Thus a Namibia settlement could lead -- and the Angolans strongly imply that this would be the case -- to the Cuban troop drawdown which we have long sought.

An additional element of the Angolan question at this moment is an increase in activity from bases in Angola in support of ZAPU's role in the Rhodesian conflict. This activity became apparent following Rhodesian attacks on training camps in Angola. From the Angolan point of view, they are the victim of both Rhodesia and South Africa.

We believe that we should:

- Continue to look toward the establishment of normal relations with Angola but for the moment the cloudy prospects for a Namibia settlement removes what could have been our major public justification for recognition.

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-2-

- Bear in mind that the linkage of Angola to the Rhodesian conflict could also increase the domestic opposition to recognition of the Angolan Government.
- Also take into account that in the near future, Angolan recognition might be useful to us as one part of a strategy of pressuring South Africa to cooperate on Namibia. It will probably be a couple of weeks, however, before we know definitely whether such a strategy would be appropriate and feasible.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

2 April 1979

MEMORANDUM

RHODESIA: LOOKING BEYOND THE APRIL ELECTION ☐

25X1

Key Judgments

The election later this month of a black-led government of national unity in Rhodesia will bring substantial pressure on the US and the UK to recognize the new government and to lift economic sanctions.

--The Rhodesians will make an all-out effort to ensure adequate security and a large turnout for the election.

--Although the Zimbabwe African National Union and the Zimbabwe African People's Union will try to disrupt the election, neither guerrilla group will be able to prevent it from taking place. ☐

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Bishop Muzorewa is the most likely candidate to emerge as the head of the new government.

--He will seek to consolidate his position by strengthening his relationship with the whites, establishing greater control over the countryside, and inducing defections from ZANU and ZAPU.

--He may try to split the guerrillas further by offering to strike a separate deal with ZANU or ZAPU.

--We doubt, however, that the white leaders will show enough flexibility to allow Muzorewa to propose a deal acceptable to either guerrilla leader. ☐

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The election of a new government, coupled with a continuation of the fighting, will create some hard choices for those states most closely involved with the Rhodesian problem.

--The frontline states will continue to support the guerrillas, but an intensification of the fighting could force some presidents into an open-ended commitment to an increased Soviet and Cuban presence in their countries.

--The frontline states might also have to consider the possibility of supporting one guerrilla group against the other in the event of a civil war. ☐

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If the Soviets and the Cubans continue to favor ZAPU over ZANU, they risk alienating Tanzania and Mozambique, who would like to see more support given to ZANU.

--If they agree to support both groups, however, they could become involved in a civil war.

--If Nkomo makes a separate deal with the Salisbury government, they might find themselves forced to throw their support behind ZANU. ☐

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
The US and the UK must decide whether to recognize the newly-elected government and lift economic sanctions.

--A positive decision would strengthen the position of the new government, but provoke a hostile reaction from the black Africans.

--A negative decision would undermine the viability of the new regime, but not deter the Africans from supporting further efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. ☐

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
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25X6

*Prospects for a successful ~~all-parties conference~~
or agreement on the part of the internal government to
UN-sponsored elections are exceedingly dim.*

*--Short-term prospects are for a continuation
of the stalemate, particularly now that South
Africa has promised to provide substantial
military and political support to the new
government.*

*--The fighting certainly will continue, providing
expanding opportunities for the Soviets and
the Cubans.* 

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The Rhodesian government is making an all-out effort to ensure adequate security and a large turnout for the election. Government pressure and intimidation by the black parties and their auxiliary forces should result in a fairly high turnout. The government estimates a total black turnout of about 60 percent, with the highest percentage being urban blacks and blacks living in white farming areas. Over 70 percent of the eligible white voters turned out for the constitutional referendum last January and at least that many should vote in the election.

25X1

All military and police leaves have been cancelled during the election period and all civilian reservists have been called up to provide security and to police the polling stations during the election. We estimate that a manpower pool totaling some 75,000 Rhodesians will be mobilized. These forces will be assisted by about 10,000 ex-guerrillas and local recruits who are loyal to internal black leaders Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole.

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As the election approaches, Rhodesian security forces will intensify their raids on guerrilla camps and staging areas in Zambia and Mozambique, and possibly in Angola, Tanzania, and Botswana. (See map on page 2.) By forcing the guerrillas to relocate their command posts further from the border and to disperse their camps, guerrilla communication links and supply lines will be lengthened, resulting in an erosion of guerrilla capabilities and morale.

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Although ZANU and ZAPU are committed to disrupting the election, it is unlikely either can prevent it from taking place. ZANU and ZAPU now have at least 10,000 guerrillas inside Rhodesia and several thousand more guerrillas are to be infiltrated before the election. Both groups plan to intimidate voters, attack electoral officials and polling stations, and possibly stage incidents near the polling stations to distract the security forces. Nevertheless, we believe the Rhodesian security forces will be able to maintain sufficient control to proceed with the polling in most if not all regions of the country.

25X1

ZAPU is planning major attacks into Rhodesia along its northern border with Zambia, but we doubt it possesses the necessary command and control capabilities to launch a major coordinated offensive. The number of guerrilla attacks on "soft" targets of psychological and economic importance to the whites, however, is certain to increase.


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The Election Process

White Rhodesians reportedly will go to the polls on 10 April to elect 20 white members to the House of Assembly. Four of these seats are contested by independents, but Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party should

Principal Military Forces Involved in Rhodesian Conflict*



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have little difficulty winning all 20 seats. The 72 black members of the House will be elected sometime after April 12 by both black and white Rhodesians. The election probably will be held over a five day period beginning 17 April. Security forces will be rotated from one region of the country to another--possibly by military district--to ensure maximum security around the polling stations. []

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Both the white and black members will be elected directly from party lists established for each constituency.* A party must win at least 10 percent of the vote in a given constituency to qualify for a seat. Parliamentary seats within each constituency will be allocated based on the proportion of votes received by the parties in that constituency. []

25X1

The 72 black and 20 white members of the House then will caucus to elect 8 additional white members from a list of 16 candidates chosen by the white members of the present parliament. The Senate will consist of 10 blacks elected by the 72 black members of the lower house, 10 whites elected by the 28 white members, and 5 Ndebele and 5 Shona chiefs elected by their tribal counterparts in the Council of Chiefs. Both houses jointly elect a "constitutional" President who then appoints as Prime Minister the person "in his discretion, he considers to be best able to command the support of the majority of the members of the House of Assembly." The President also appoints the cabinet, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. (See chart on page 4.) []


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Although the new parliament will be numerically dominated by blacks, the whites will retain substantial--if not controlling--influence over the new government. Continued white domination of the military, police, judiciary, and civil service will be ensured by the constitution, which establishes criteria such as senior rank, longevity, and "efficiency and suitability" for appointment to top positions in these fields. []

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**Maps of the white and black electoral constituencies and the five military operational areas appear at the end of this memorandum.*

Formation of Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia



Moreover, none of the important clauses in the new constitution can be amended or deleted without the approval of all 72 black and at least 6 white members of the House of Assembly. These so-called "entrenched" clauses, which guarantee the whites 28 seats in the House, will remain in effect for at least 10 years, after which a commission--consisting of three whites and two blacks--will be established and empowered to recommend changes. The constitution also states that posts in the cabinet will be allocated according to each party's strength in the House of Assembly, thus guaranteeing the whites at least four positions in the new cabinet.

25X1

Most whites probably are not enthusiastic about a black-led government taking power in Rhodesia, but they appear willing to give the new government a chance. White emmigration dropped considerably this year after a dramatic rise last fall--peaking at 2,937 net departures in December. Net departures for January and February totaled only 1,073 and 592 whites, respectively.

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Muzorewa on Top

Bishop Abel Muzorewa should emerge in a strong position of leadership in the new government of national unity, with his party winning at least half the black seats in Parliament. (See chart on page 6.) His closest rival, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, has lost ground in recent months, and his party probably will win less than a third of the black seats. Chief Jerimiah Chirau, the other black leader in the internal government, lacks broad popular support but should pick up a few seats. Chief Ndiweni, who broke with Chirau last November to form his own Ndebele-based party, has not developed a strong political base, but his party could win enough seats to gain a post in the cabinet.

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Muzorewa hopes to establish more government control over the countryside by augmenting the size and expanding the role of the auxiliary forces. He also hopes to attract more black supporters--including guerrilla defectors--by offering land and social services. The Bishop is expected to announce a major amnesty program soon after taking office that would encourage the guerrillas to return, but not require them to turn in their arms. The government is hoping that many of these guerrillas would agree to join the auxiliary forces.

25X1

Muzorewa has already entered into negotiations with the white leaders, focusing on cooperation between their parties and a possible modification of some clauses in the new constitution that work to the disadvantage of the blacks. The Bishop realizes that he will need white

Probable Distribution of Seats in New Rhodesian Parliament




Prime Minister Ian Smith
(Rhodesian Front)

Under pressure from some whites to leave politics, but so far has resisted. Most if not all, RF candidates are running unopposed.



Bishop Abel Muzorewa
(United African National Council)

Most likely candidate for Prime Minister but would rather place himself above partisan politics and could opt for the Presidency.




Reverend Ndabanings Sithole
(Zimbabwe African National Union/Sithole)

Broke with ZANU external organization in 1977. Popularity appears to be on the decline inside Rhodesia.



Chief Kayisa Ndiweni
(United National Federal Party)

Broke with Chirau and the transitional govt. early this year to form a Ndebele-based party. Would be a stalking horse for Nkomo in the election.



Chief Jerimiah Chirau
(Zimbabwe United People's Organization)

Generally considered a "stooge" of the whites but recently has taken a more independent position calling for an all parties conference before the election and the disbanding of all auxiliary forces.

support for his government and wants to meet with the white leaders before the election to discuss possible ministerial appointments, to plan future government policies, and to map a joint strategy for obtaining international recognition for the new government. [] 25X1

Once in power, Muzorewa should be able to capitalize on several trends that have become apparent in recent months, including:

- A deepening political and military rivalry between ZANU and ZAPU. With the virtual collapse of negotiations for a political settlement, each group has come increasingly to perceive the other as a rival in the struggle for control of a black-ruled Rhodesia.
- Continuing disarray within the ZAPU leadership that has weakened Nkomo's position internationally and within his own organization, making it almost impossible for ZAPU to implement its more grandiose military plans.
- The decline of Nkomo's appeal to whites in Rhodesia since the downing of two civilian airliners by his guerrillas.
- Growing weariness in Zambia over the economic and political costs of the guerrilla struggle, which could eventually lead to a political backlash against President Kaunda.
- Growing support for the internal settlement in the US Congress and the British Parliament.
- South African promises to provide substantial political and military support--short of military intervention--to the new government of national unity. [] 25X1

The South Africans have also said that they no longer would press Prime Minister Smith to withdraw from politics so long as his presence does not hinder the new government's chance of success. Prime Minister Botha has indicated, however, that South Africa will withhold diplomatic recognition from the new government; we expect Botha to wait until the new government has won some international acceptance and demonstrated a capacity to govern. [] 25X1

These factors account for a growing confidence among whites that the internal settlement eventually might succeed. A continuation of these trends could lead to a hardening of white attitudes and a growing

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reluctance to seek a political deal with the guerrillas. Given the probability that the level of fighting inside Rhodesia will escalate, however, most whites probably will continue to support efforts to negotiate a political settlement with the blacks. ☐ 25X1

25X1

Possible Realignments ☐

The formation of a black-led government will open the door to more jockeying among the various players in the Rhodesian situation. Muzorewa, in particular, probably will try to split the guerrillas further by seeking a separate alliance with ZANU or ZAPU. ☐ 25X1

Representatives of the Bishop have already made approaches to ZANU to discuss a possible Shona-based alliance, which could draw on 75 percent of the black population for support. (See map on page 8.) Although ZANU so far has rejected Muzorewa's attempts to induce it--or a significant faction of the guerrilla group--to join his new government, some senior officials have indicated they would not rule out talks at some future date. ☐ 25X1

25X1

Joshua Nkomo might try to preempt such an alliance by seeking to make his own deal either with Muzorewa, or with the whites, thus bringing the Ndebeles and the Shonas into a single government. White Rhodesian politicians would favor such a coalition because they see Nkomo as a unifying force and regard Mugabe as too radical. ☐ 25X1

The pressure on Mugabe or Nkomo to consider joining forces with the internal government is likely to mount the more each leader perceives the other as trying to preempt him in reaching a settlement. Neither of these realignments, however, would tip the balance of power in Rhodesia sufficiently to bring an end to the fighting because each excludes a major participant who could attract enough foreign support to continue the guerrilla war. Nevertheless, either could change the complexion of the war from one of equilibrium and growing strength on the guerrillas' side to one of strength for the new government in Salisbury. ☐ 25X1

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
Hard Choices Ahead ☐

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The election of a government of national unity, coupled with a continuation of the fighting, will create some hard choices for the parties involved with the Rhodesian problem. The frontline states will continue to support the guerrillas, but an intensification of the fighting could force Presidents Kaunda of Zambia and Machel of Mozambique into an open-ended commitment to an increased Soviet and Cuban presence in

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Population Distribution in Zimbabwe Rhodesia



ETHNIC GROUP	PERCENT OF BLACK POPULATION
Shona	75
Karanga	25
Zezeru	21
Manyika	11
Ndau	6
Korekore	5
Other	5
Ndebele	14
Kalanga	7
Other (Tonga, Venda, Sena)	4

their countries. (See graphic on page 11.) Kaunda has consistently resisted any augmentation of the Soviet and Cuban role in Zambia, but he might feel forced to reverse himself if it appeared this was the only way to resolve the conflict and remove the military threat posed to his country by the Rhodesians. Machel is less concerned about the Soviet and Cuban presence, largely because of his ideological commitment to ZANU, but he probably is anxious to prevent it from endangering the pragmatic economic ties he has established with South Africa. []

25X1

In the hope of minimizing the military spillover into their countries, Kaunda and Machel might consider urging Nkomo and Mugabe to strike a separate deal with the government in Salisbury. Such an approach, however, would risk seriously antagonizing the other frontline states. The frontline presidents also have to consider the possibility of supporting one guerrilla group against the other in a contest for power in Rhodesia.

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


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The Soviet and Cuban Role []

The common objective of Moscow and Havana is to secure influence in a black-ruled Rhodesia, and they have decided that backing ZAPU leader Nkomo is the best means to that end. The election of a government of national unity will not force any immediate changes on the Soviets or the Cubans. The fighting will continue, and they will support the guerrillas, hoping that the military pressure will bring a settlement favorable to Nkomo. They will play on African fears of Western recognition of the new government to maintain the momentum of the military option.

25X1



Beyond that, the options available to the Soviets and Cubans have not fully taken form. They will take their cue from the response of the Africans to efforts by the new government to entice the guerrilla leaders to return to Rhodesia. Should Nkomo return, Moscow and Havana probably would prefer to support him. Even though Nyerere and Machel would disagree, the Soviets would weigh the opportunities to improve their credibility and influence with Zambia against the belief that any friction with Tanzania and Mozambique would only be temporary. []

25X1

Nevertheless, Nkomo's return to Rhodesia carries with it the risk that Nkomo would cut his ties with the Soviets and the Cubans in the process, thereby leading them to support ZANU. This assumes that ZANU's military effort does not evaporate as a result of large-scale defections to the new government. At the present time, Moscow and Havana cannot



✓ support both ZAPU and ZANU because of the rivalry between them and the potential it holds for an eventual contest between them for power in Rhodesia. ☐

25X1

Pressures on the US and the UK ☐

25X1

The newly elected government in Rhodesia will press the US and the UK to recognize it and lift economic sanctions. It will argue that the election meets the demands of the US and UK for a transfer of power to a black government on the basis of one man, one vote. ☐

25X1

Recognizing the new government and lifting sanctions certainly would strengthen it. There would be greater white resolve to support the black-led government and a greater willingness among whites in the military to defend it. Government prospects for attracting large numbers of guerrilla defectors could also be enhanced if the economy improved sufficiently to allow the government to improve social services for the blacks. ☐

25X1

The lifting of sanctions would improve the chances of stemming Rhodesia's economic decline and would provide substantial economic benefits and give a major psychological boost to the internal regime. Worldwide demand has been increasing for many goods produced by the Rhodesians such as copper, gold, and chrome. ☐

25X1

At the same time, such a decision would seriously erode the "special relationship" the US has fostered with black African leaders--particularly Zambian President Kaunda, Tanzanian President Nyerere, and Nigerian President Obasanjo. They would conclude that the US and the UK had chosen to support the "enemy" and thus would come under increasing pressure from the guerrillas and the Soviets to pursue a military solution in Rhodesia. ☐

25X1

Such a basic policy shift would also weaken the credibility of Western support for the UN transitional program for Namibia in the eyes of both the Africans and the white government in Pretoria. In fact, the South Africans probably have already interpreted moves to send US observers to cover the Rhodesian elections as evidence of a general weakening of US determination to pursue the UN transition program for Namibia, giving them more room to push a final settlement on their own terms. ☐

25X1

While some African leaders might support lifting sanctions if it were followed by US and UK efforts to include ZANU or ZAPU in the new government, the frontline African leaders would be further antagonized

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by such a strategy. A call for a new constitution--providing for a more rapid transition to full black rule and approved by both blacks and whites--might dispel some of the frontline president's resentment, but it would still leave the US and the UK very much in disfavor. []

25X1

Faced with a refusal by the US and the UK to lift sanctions, the internal government would have difficulty taking hold. White emigration probably would increase as the level of fighting escalated. Whites in the military would begin to question why they were fighting for a black-led government that was unable to win external support. []

25X1

The frontline states and Nigeria would continue to support Anglo-American efforts toward a political settlement, on the basis that the election was merely one step in a process that eventually would involve the guerrillas in a negotiated settlement. They probably would remain highly skeptical, however, that such efforts would succeed. Meanwhile, regardless of what the US and the UK choose to do, Soviet and Cuban involvement with the guerrilla forces--and with their hosts--would continue to grow. []

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
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
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Constituencies for the Election of 72 Black Members to the Zimbabwe Rhodesia House of Assembly




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Constituencies for the Election of 20 White Members to the Zimbabwe Rhodesia House of Assembly




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Operational Areas in Zimbabwe Rhodesia



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